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Introduction 
 
 
From Yemen War to Joint Army? 
Egyptian-Saudi Differences over Arab Military Cooperation 
Jessica Noll and Stephan Roll 
On 25 March 2015 a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states launched air strikes on Yemen 
to halt the advance of the Houthi movement. A few days later the summit of the Arab 
League decided to set up a joint Arab army. Nevertheless, the two most important Arab 
countries support opposing concepts for military cooperation: Egypt proposes institu-
tionalised long-term military cooperation to increase its political weight in the region, 
while Saudi Arabia prefers ad hoc coalitions precisely in order to avoid long-term 
dependency on other countries, not least Egypt. However, the two events suggest that 
states in the region are stepping up military cooperation. Germany and the European 
Union should treat this development with scepticism. Experience shows that such col-
laborations tend to exacerbate rather than resolve regional conflicts. 
 
At their summit meeting at the Egyptian 
resort of Sharm al-Sheikh on 28 and 29 
March 2015, the members of the Arab 
League agreed to set up joint armed forces. 
According to the final declaration of the 
summit, the force should be capable of 
rapid intervention to guarantee the national 
sovereignty of member states and protect 
them against territorial threats. The pro-
posal apparently implies a force of 40,000 
encompassing all military branches. But 
the details remain to be clarified in a series 
of meetings of high-ranking military leaders 
over the coming four months. 
Not a New Idea 
Although the formation of a joint army was 
announced only shortly after the beginning 
of the Saudi military operation against the 
Houthi movement in Yemen, there is no 
direct connection between the two events. 
Consequently the Arab League resolution 
makes no mention of the Yemen conflict. 
In fact, the joint army project is an Egyptian 
initiative that President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi 
first floated in February 2015 in connection 
with Egyptian air strikes against the so-
called Islamic State in Libya. 
But the idea is much older and has been 
discussed at intervals for decades. After the 
first Arab-Israeli War in 1948/49 the then 
seven members of the Arab League signed 
a collective defence agreement, promising 
individual and collective aid for any treaty 
partner who came under attack, explicitly 
including military support. To date, how-
ever, the treaty has remained largely inef-
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fectual, with the League mandating only 
multilateral military missions, for example 
in 1976 in Lebanon. 
The only serious attempt to date to 
create a joint army was undertaken several 
decades ago in the Arabian Peninsula. After 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the out-
break of the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf monar-
chies felt their security was endangered and 
founded the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) 
in 1982, whose strength is reported to have 
reached 40,000 men. But plans for a joint 
command structure appear never to have 
been realised. The PSF was deployed in the 
Second Gulf War (1990/91) and since 2011 
to suppress uprising against the monarchy 
in Bahrain. 
Egyptian Calculations 
Cairo explains its motivation to revive the 
project of a pan-Arab army with the terrorist 
threat that the region is currently facing. By 
doing so, the Egyptian government applies 
a questionable definition of terrorism that 
focuses largely on demonising the 
moderate Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. 
However, security interests only in part 
explain the Egyptian initiative. The real 
reason for the Sisi administration is to ex-
pand Egypt’s regional influence. With well 
over 400,000 on active service and almost 
half a million reservists, Egypt possesses by 
far the largest armed forces in the region. 
This fact alone would afford it a natural 
leading role in any joint army. Egypt could 
position itself as a permanent protector, 
especially for the Gulf states which – Cairo 
calculates – would regard the joint army 
as a bulwark in the festering conflict with 
Iran, as well as for the eventuality of inter-
nal disorder. 
Given Egypt’s economic problems, the 
timing of the initiative is not coincidental. 
Since the military coup in summer 2013 
Cairo has manoeuvred itself into a trouble-
some dependency on the three Gulf monar-
chies Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and Kuwait. Since July 2013 these 
states have granted the new Egyptian regime 
aid, loans and energy supplies amounting 
to more than $23 billion – assistance that 
has been vital for securing Sisi’s grip on 
power. The Gulf leaders were motivated to 
support the military coup by worries that 
a successful Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
could lead to similar developments in their 
own states. 
In view of empty state coffers and shrink-
ing foreign currency reserves, Egypt will 
remain for the foreseeable future utterly 
dependent on financial support from the 
Gulf monarchies to avoid bankruptcy. From 
Cairo’s perspective, setting up a joint army 
would be a crucial step to convert one-sided 
dependency into mutual benefit. 
Saudi Disinterest 
Although the declaration of intent was 
signed by all twenty-two members of the 
Arab League, responses to the Egyptian 
initiative were mixed. Iraq and Tunisia 
expressed scepticism, while Algeria offered 
only to assist with training and funding. 
But the central obstacle is likely to be Saudi 
disinterest. While expressing no official 
doubts in public, behind the scenes the 
Kingdom made no secret of its opposition. 
The Saudi intervention in Yemen put a 
damper on the plan to institutionalise mili-
tary cooperation under the auspices of the 
Arab League before it even began. Instead 
of seeking an Arab League mandate, Saudi 
Arabia launched air strikes just days before 
the summit, having successfully formed a 
coalition of nine Arab states under its leader-
ship and gained the backing of the United 
States. The military contributions of its coa-
lition partners are limited, however. Egypt, 
officially also a member of the coalition, 
only sent four warships to guard the Bab 
al-Mandab strait at the entrance to the Red 
Sea – which is strategically vital for Egypt. 
In view of the support it receives from the 
Saudi leadership, it is very striking that 
Egypt is not participating directly in the 
fighting. 
The reasons for the meagre role of the 
Egyptian armed forces are likely to be the 
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same as those for Saudi disinterest in the 
joint force initiative. After Salman’s suc-
cession to the throne following the death of 
his brother King Abdullah, Riyadh is plainly 
reassessing its partnership with Egypt. For 
the new leadership worries about Iranian 
hegemonic ambitions and a further streng-
thening of the (Tehran-allied) Houthi move-
ment in Yemen have greater weight than 
fears of the Muslim Brotherhood. But above 
all, the Saudis are unlikely to have over-
looked the Egyptian calculation behind its 
drive for institutionalisation of military 
cooperation. The royal family’s willingness 
to bolster Egypt’s threadbare economy in-
definitely is probably extremely limited, 
not least because Cairo is not a particularly 
attractive security partner. 
The Egyptian armed forces are at best 
capable of territorial defence in the scope of 
a conventional war. Besides their ability to 
respond to asymmetrical threats or conduct 
rapid military interventions is very weak. 
This becomes obvious in the Sinai, where 
the Egyptian army has been trying for years 
to restore the state’s authority – without 
success. Although the leadership has been 
pursuing a comprehensive modernisation 
of the armed forces since 2011, its imple-
mentation will take years and will not im-
prove short-term operational capability. 
Unlike for example Pakistan, with which 
Saudi Arabia has conducted close military 
cooperation since the 1970s, Egypt possesses 
no nuclear weapons that could serve pur-
poses of deterrence in the conflict with 
Iran. 
Outlook 
The future of Arab military cooperation 
could depend decisively on the course of 
the war in Yemen. It is questionable wheth-
er the Saudi air strikes have weakened the 
Houthi as intended. If Saudi Arabia contem-
plates a broader military operation, which 
seems unlikely from today’s perspective, it 
will have to rely more strongly on support 
from allies. Given that its traditional mili-
tary partner Pakistan has shown little en-
thusiasm for the Yemen offensive, the King-
dom might find itself forced after all to 
seek Egyptian support. And that might also 
boost Egypt’s initiative for a joint army. If 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to agree in 
principle – as the Arab world’s most popu-
lous country and largest economy respec-
tively – that would definitely send a strong 
political message. 
But if the Egyptian contribution in 
Yemen remains more symbolic in nature, 
for example restricted to joint manoeuvres 
and a limited naval presence, the project of 
an Arab army is likely to end in nothing but 
talk. The respective security interests, and 
not least the threat scenarios of the individ-
ual countries, are too different. The Egyp-
tian definition of terrorism in particular is 
contested in the region. By no means all the 
states there regard the Muslim Brotherhood 
as terrorists. 
Even if the follow-up process initially 
goes ahead, it is therefore hard to imagine 
the states involved agreeing to set up a com-
mon military command structure. Numer-
ous technical obstacles would also have to 
be overcome, partly stemming from lack 
of interoperability and from differences in 
training and equipment. 
Implications for German and 
European Military Cooperation 
Independently of the question of the pros-
pects of greater institutionalisation, it 
must be assumed that military cooperation 
between Arab states will increase and inten-
sify. This is reflected in particular in the 
growing willingness of individual countries 
to participate in collective military opera-
tions to enforce their interests. But conflicts 
have been exacerbated rather than resolved 
through the joint missions. In the conflict 
with the protest movement in Bahrain 
in 2011 Saudi and Emirate forces made a 
decisive contribution to suppressing the 
opposition and preserving authoritarian 
structures. The air strikes against Islamist 
positions in Libya that the UAE conducted 
with Egyptian backing in 2014 served to 
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support the Libyan General Chalifa Haftar, 
but hampered necessary negotiations 
between the different parties in the Libyan 
civil war. And the intervention by the 
Saudi-led coalition has further destabilised 
Yemen. The humanitarian situation has 
dramatically worsened and a political solu-
tion has been made considerably more 
difficult. 
Germany and the European Union should 
therefore not expect intensified military 
cooperation among the Arab states to auto-
matically have a stabilising effect on the 
region. As long as cooperation serves pri-
marily to secure the rule of authoritarian 
regimes, and in fact undermines the estab-
lishment of mechanisms for political con-
flict resolution, the opposite will be the case. 
Arab military cooperation represents 
a special challenge for European security 
cooperation with Arab states. Arms and 
military know-how may end up being used 
in contexts for which they were not origi-
nally intended. Arab cooperation may lead 
to situations where recipients of military 
assistance become involved in activities 
that have nothing to do with national de-
fence – as demonstrated lately by the par-
ticipation of a series of Arab states in the 
Saudi intervention in Yemen. This may 
contradict German and European interests. 
More consideration should therefore be 
given to the implications of Arab military 
cooperation for arms export control. 
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